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UNFORGIVING OF THOSE WHO TRESPASS
AGAINST U.S.: STATE LAWS CRIMINALIZING
IMMIGRATION STATUS
Karla Mari McKanders*
INTRODUCTION
Since around 2005, states and localities have been using criminal
trespass laws to target undocumented immigrants for unlawful presence. In
New Hampshire, California, and Florida, local police officers have used
2
state criminal trespass laws to prosecute undocumented immigrants. For
example, the New Hampshire criminal trespass laws provide that a person
is guilty "if, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or
remains in any place." 3 New Hampshire has applied this law to immigrants
it believes to be unlawfully present in violation of immigration laws.
Specifically, in April 2010, Arizona passed SB 1070: Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. SB 1070 creates crimes
involving trespassing by "illegal aliens" and harboring or concealing
unlawful aliens. The Act's intent is to use state government actors to target
undocumented immigrants to increase the attrition of immigrants it deems
to be unlawfully present in Arizona.6 "The provisions of this act ... are
intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in
* J.D., Duke University School of Law; B.A. Spelman College. Special thanks to Joan
Hemmingway and Kenneth McKanders for their insightful comments and feedback. Thank you to
my research assistants Ashley Adams and Rachel Watson.
1. Pam Belluck, Town Uses Trespass Law to Fight Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July,
13, 2005, available at www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/national/I 3immigrants.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2011).
2. Id.
3. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (1971).
4. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509
(2010).
5. Arizona State Senate, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. Fact Sheet for S.B. 1070 (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/summary/s. I 070pshs.doc.htm.
6. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 2 (Ariz. 2010).
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the United States."7  State trespass laws that criminalize unlawful presence
of immigrants in the form of trespass statutes are unconstitutional
regulations of immigration and are a preempted exercise of state power.
This paper is the first paper in legal academia to analyze the
constitutionality of criminal trespass statutes as applied to immigrants. Thus
far, immigration law scholars have taken various positions on state and
local regulation of immigration.8 For example, Michael Olivas believes that
state, county, and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration
functions are unconstitutional and a function of exclusive federal pre-
emptory power. He believes that shifting immigration powers to the sub-
federal level will likely lead to weaker federal enforcement and less
7. Id
8. Kai Bartolomeo, immigration and the Constitutionality of Local Self Help: Escondido's
Undocumented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 855, 857 (2008); Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1557, 1600 (2008) ("[t]he transformation of immigration law from a focus on foreign affairs
and national identity to a seemingly domestic issue, touching on center areas of state concern, has
invited the states into the immigration arena"); see also Laurel R. Boatright, "Clear Eye for the
State Guy:" Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with
Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1645 n.63 (2006); Michael A. Olivas,
Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice and the Proper Role for
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 53 (2007); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to
Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and The Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373
(2006); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008) (positing that the issues regarding state and local regulation of
immigration are not really about immigration at all; instead, they are about local resource
allocation); L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting The Freedom of Undocumented
Immigrants as Violations ofEqual Protection and Principles ofFederal Preemption, 52 ST. LOUiS
U. L.J. 479, 480 (2008). But see Roe v. Prince William County, 525 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D.Va.
2007) (in Prince William County, Virginia, a lawsuit was filed questioning the legality of an
ordinance which permitted "police officers to question otherwise lawfully detained persons about
their immigration status and authorizing county personnel to determine what services might be
lawfully denied based on immigration status."); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493
(2001) (He advocates for strict removal of state and local involvement in regulation of
immigration and alienage law and arguing against state and local participation in immigration
enforcement on civil rights grounds. His article does not analyze the current state and municipal
regulation of immigration, as it was written to critique the 1996 Personal Responsibility Work and
Reform Act.). When discussing immigration and crimes most articles discuss the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions. See generally Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders:
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007);
Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009); Yolanda Vazquez,
Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The
Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20
BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 31 (2010).
9. Olivas, supra note 8.
State Laws Criminalizing Immigration Status
effective national security resources aimed at immigration enforcement and
administration.'o Immigration law scholar Cristina Rodriguez posits that
the issues regarding state and local regulation of immigration are not reall X
about immigration at all; instead, they are about local resource allocation.
Accordingly, she advocates for state and local regulation.1 In my article,
Welcome to Hazleton, I proposed that Congress enact laws expressly
preempting state and local action unless specifically provided for in the text
of the federal law.13  Similarly, in the context of state and local laws
policing immigration status, I again maintain that states and localities can
only act when Congress gives them express permission.
This symposium examines the recent increase in the involvement of
state and local governments in enacting and enforcing laws targeting
immigrant populations. This increase began in 2007 in Hazleton,
Pennsylvania with the passage of ordinances targeting undocumented
immigrants.14 The main concern of state criminal laws that sanction
unlawful presence is whether they are constitutionally preempted.
Specifically, it has been alleged that the Arizona statute and Arizona-like
laws restrain the liberty of U.S. citizens and documented immigrants and
interfere with federal immigration policy.'5  State and local laws
sanctioning unlawful presence substantially overlap with the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"),'6 Immigration and Nationality Act's
1996 criminal provisions sanctioning unlawful entry and re-entry, 7 and
civil immi ration penalties for unlawful presence as a ground for
deportation.
In evaluating the constitutionality of state trespass laws that
10. Id.
i1. Rodriguez, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1, 48-49 (2007) [hereinafter McKanders, Hazleton].
14. Id; Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 579 (2009) [hereinafter McKanders, Arkansas
Symposium Piece].
15. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted by Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S.Ct. 3498 (Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-
115).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2010) (unlawful entry
has been a crime since 1929, see Act of Mar. 4, 1929, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 276 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2010) (illegal re-entry provisions).
18. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)-(C) (1996); 8 U.S.C. § i182(a)(1)(B)-(C)
(2010) (unlawful presence is a ground for deportation and is not subject to criminal penalty,
except when an alien is present in the United States after having been removed).
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criminalize immigration status, this paper proceeds in three parts. The first
part of the paper details how as a sovereign nation, U.S. laws have excluded
undesirable categories of people from admission and have attempted to
criminalize specific immigration violations. Early immigration laws
provided civil sanctions for unlawful presence, and also provided criminal
sanctions for unlawful entry and re-entry.19 The second part explains and
critiques the sections of SB 107020 that create separate state criminal
offenses for violating federal immigration laws-namely unlawful presence
or criminal trespass. The third part analyzes the constitutionality of the
criminal provisions of SB 1070 that make it a state crime to be unlawfully
present in the state in relation to specific provisions of the INA and federal
immigration policy. The paper concludes that state trespass laws that
criminalize unlawful presence of immigrants and attempt to delegate
immigration enforcement to state officials are unconstitutional regulations
of immigration and are therefore a preempted exercise of state power.
I. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAWS EXCLUDING
"UNDESIRABLES"
Traditionally immigration laws are considered a nation's prerogative
as a nation-state has the ability to discriminate against who is permitted to
21
enter. Immigration law is the social construct that creates illegality, which
is subject to the values that the nation wants to inculcate through the
admission or exclusion of certain populations.
The most straightforward way to define illegal migration is by
reference to the migration law of the state doing the counting. Under
this method, anyone who is currently in contravention of the law has
an 'illegal' status. This will include people who enter the country in
breach of the law and those who overstay their permission to remain.
[I]llegality is a creation of the law.23
This part describes U.S. history on how the law, depending on the time
period, has expanded or contracted regulating immigrants who are
19. Id.
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2010).
21. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 531, 603-04 (1889) (Supreme Court stating
"[t]hat the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can
exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a
part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the
control of another power.").
22. CATHERINE DAUVERGENE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS
FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 174 (2008).
23. Id. at 11-12.
334 [Vol. 12
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permitted to enter and remain in the country. In describing recent state
action regulating migration, this part critiques the desire of states to reassert
control over immigration (after centuries of federal regulation) by
criminalizing violations of immigration laws and identifies the problems
that arise when civil immigration laws are converted into criminal offenses.
The history of U.S. immigration regulation provides a framework for
understanding constitutional and policy implications of current state and
local laws that criminalize unlawful immigration status.
A. CATEGORICAL IMMIGRATION EXCLUSIONS
For the first centuries of our country's existence, states regulated
24immigration. Despite the federal government's current role in regulating
immigration and enforcing immigration law, at the beginning of U.S.
history, the state governments were primarily responsible for regulating
immigrants within the state's border. The Constitution was not clear about
which sector of government should regulate immigration.25
During the 1600s, the colonies began excluding immigrants they
deemed undesirable for admission. Specifically, in 1639, "colonies began
legislating to exclude 'paupers' and 'criminals."' 26  Early immigration
policies included the exclusion of public charges-persons that were likely
to become dependent on the state for aid. Immigration rules "excluding
'public charges' embraced not only people sent b English courts but also
the poor and the diseased who came voluntarily.' Early restrictions show
the hostilities settlers began having towards immigrants, which resulted in
blanket exclusions of certain undesirable categories.28
In the 1700s, the federal government began to regulate immigration.
Specifically, in 1789, the United States Constitution granted the states
29broad power to regulate foreign commerce, which included immigration.
It was not until the Supreme Court construed federal power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution broadly that immigration became a
federal regulatory issue.3 o The Supreme Court did not begin to address state
24. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (5th
ed. 2005).
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
2 8. Id.
29. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has the power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization).
30. The Court determined that because of Congress's plenary power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, "[a] concurrent power in the States to regulate commerce is an
anomaly not found in the Constitution." Smith v. City of Boston, 48 U.S. 283, 396 (1849) (The
2011]) 335
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regulation of immigration until the emergence of the Passenger Cases.3 1 In
Passenger Cases, "[t]he Supreme Court struck down laws enacted in
Boston and New York that imposed special taxes on aliens and passengers
arriving from foreign ports."32
In the 1840s, there was an increase in religious-based exclusions of
immigrants. At the time, the country was predominately Protestant;
Catholic Irish were excluded.33 "Several groups and overlapping political
parties, including social reformers, Protestant evangelicals, the Nativists,
the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, and the Know-Nothing Party,
campaigned for legislation halting immigration and prohibiting naturalized
immigrants from participating in the nation's political process.'
In 1875, the Supreme Court decided Henderson v. Mayor of New
35 36York which definitively barred state restrictions on immigration. At
issue in Henderson was a tax that New York imposed on every immigrant
who arriving in its ports. Henderson held that the New York tax was an
impermissible regulation of commerce with foreign nations.3 8 The Court
found that this regulation did not fall within the police power of the state.39
This year marked the beginnings of pervasive federal regulation of
immigration. In Henderson, the Court found state restrictions on
immigration to be an unconstitutional infringement on the federal power
40
over foreign commerce.
In 1875, Congress also passed the first restrictive immigration
statute. 4' Congress barred convicts and prostitutes from admission into the
country.4 2 "These limits were the first of many 'qualit, control' exclusions
based on the nature of the immigrants themselves. Following suit, in
1882, Congress enacted more legislation that excluded lunatics, idiots, and
immigrants who were likely to become public charges.4 In 1891, Congress
Passenger Cases); see also McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13.
31. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283.
32. Id.
33. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 5.
34. Id.
35. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 263.
40. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 4.
41. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
42. Id.
43. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 4.
44. An Act to Regulate Immigration, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (1882); see also Edye
[Vol. 12336
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also enacted legislation barring diseased individuals, paupers, and
polygamists from admission.45 Most of the legislation prohibited these
categories of immigrants from migrating as they were thought to be a
46burden on the U.S. economy.
During the 1900s the United States expanded the immigration laws to
limit the migration of "undesirable" populations. For example, the
Immigration Act of 1917 excluded certain nationalities from Asia, Southern
and Eastern Europe, and anarchist nations.4 7 Further, in 1892, the Geary
48Act excluded persons of Chinese decent. In 1921, Congress passed the
first quotas that limited the migration of specific nationalities to three
percent.4 9 In addition in 1903, Congress passed a law that excluded
epileptics, the insane, beggars, and anarchists from admission.50  Congress
continued to exclude undesirable populations including migrants who were
deemed feebleminded, the tubercular, and those persons with a mental or
physical defect that "may affect" their ability to earn a living.5'
These exclusions were facilitated, in part, by the Immigration
Commission's 1911 report. The report:
v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 590-91, 249-50 (1884) (citing 1882 Immigration Act stating that "[i]t
directs that such officers shall go on board vessels arriving from abroad, and if, on examination,
they shall find any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself,
without becoming a public charge, they shall report to the collector, and such person shall not be
permitted to land. It is also enacted that convicts, except for political offenses, shall be returned to
the nations to which they belong. And the secretary is directed to prepare rules for the protection
of the immigrant who needs it, and for the return of those who are not permitted to land. This act
of congress is similar, in its essential features, to many statutes enacted by states of the Union for
the protection of their own citizens, and for the good of the immigrants who land at sea-ports
within their borders. That the purpose of these statutes is humane, is highly beneficial to the poor
and helpless immigrant, and is essential to the protection of the people in whose midst they are
deposited by the steam-ships, is beyond dispute").
45. An Act in amendment to the various Acts relative to immigration and the importation of
aliens under contract or agreement to perform Labor, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1086 (1891);
see also Moffitt v. United States, 128 F. 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1904) (citing 1891 Act stating that
section one provided that "[t]he following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into
the United States, in accordance with the existing acts regulating immigration, other than those
concerning Chinese laborers: All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a
public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who
have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of
another or who is assisted by others to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on
special inquiry that such person does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded classes.").
46. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 4.
47. Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889 (1917).
48. The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2-9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
49. The Quota Act, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (1912-1923).
50. Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
51. Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898 (1907).
2011] 337
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concluded that twentieth century immigration to the U.S. was
significantly different from earlier immigration and that the new
immigration was dominated by the so-called 'inferior' and 'less
desirable' groups. As a result, the Commission concluded that the
United States no longer benefited from a liberal immigration policy
and should impose further entry restrictions. The Commission
52
recommended a literacy test as one such restriction.
Even though these restrictions were in place, they were extremely hard to
enforce because the Immigration Commission had limited power and
53
resources to enforce the immigration laws. The United States also had a
pattern of excluding certain racial and ethnic groups. For example, in 1907,
Japanese immigration was restricted.54  The philosophy behind the
immigration restrictions were based on whether particular immigrant
55groups would be able to assimilate into America.
The exclusion of certain racial and ethnic populations was halted
56during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. Specifically, in 1965, the
Immigration Act was passed which abolished all racial quotas and racial
considerations from influencing whether a person could immigrate to the
United States. Before that happened, however, in 1952, Congress passed
the INA which solidified the federal government's control over
immigration.58 The INA created an in-depth system to govern immigrants'
entrance into and exit out of the United States and the conditions under
which immigrants could remain in the United States.59 Today, the INA
regulates the conduct of immigration judges in conducting hearings,so the61
conditions under which an immigrant may be removed from the country,
62
and crimes for unlawful entry and re-entry into the United States.
52. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 9. See generally DILLINGHAM
COMMISSION REPORTS, REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1911, VOL. 1-2, 650.
53. Id.
54. Immigration Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 898 (1907).
55. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 24, at 10.
56. Id.
57. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 917 (1965).
58. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
59. Id.
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2009).
61. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 231-41 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2009).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2010) (unlawful entry
has been a crime since 1929, see Act of Mar. 4, 1929, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2010) (illegal re-entry provisions).
[Vol. 12338
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The history of American immigration laws demonstrates that the
United States has not utilized neutral, egalitarian methods to decide which
persons are admitted into the country. Immigration law scholar Michael
Olivas finds a striking similarity between current state and local
immigration regulation and older racial exclusionary immigration laws.63
Government immigration policies have historically excluded persons in a
sometimes arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. The characteristics used to
exclude undesirable persons have been based on a person's race and
nationality (i.e. Chinese exclusion Act); religion (Catholic); and their
economic standing (public charge concept). When we view current state
and local laws that target immigrants in light of the past exclusionary
immigration laws, current state and local laws demonstrate repeating
patterns that exclude unfavorable groups based on arbitrary and
66discriminatory characteristics.
As this section demonstrates, depending on the time period,
immigration laws can reinforce stereotypes about which immigrant
populations are deserving of membership.
The minimal content of the term 'illegal' obscures the identities of
those to whom it is affixed. While any number of people may infringe
migration laws and regulations, the label adheres better to some than to
others. We imagine illegals as poor and brown and destitute, not a
67backpacking tourist that overstays a visa.
It is in this context that the law reifies the exclusion of certain populations,
sometimes on arbitrary and biased grounds.68 Immigration law Scholar
63. Olivas, supra note 8, at 55 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking
down anti-Chinese ordinances)); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C. Cal. 1879) (No.
6,546) (striking down local ordinance regulating hair length); see also BILL ONG HING, MAKING
AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990 (Stanford Univ.
Press 1993).
64. The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2-9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Aliens and Nationality, ch. 14, §§ 1, 2,
28 Stat. 7 (1893).
65. See, e.g., Karla McKanders, Unspoken Voice of Indigenous Women in Immigration Raids,
14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (2010) [hereinafter McKanders, Unspoken Voice]; Kevin R.
Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995).;
see also Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 955, 986 (1988) (for legal scholarship on the
undocumented).
66. McKanders, Unspoken Voice, supra note 65.
67. DAUVERGENE, supra note 22, at 16.
68. Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010).
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Kevin Johnson has stated: "[i]mmigration law offers a helpful gauge for
measuring this nation's racial sensibilities. 69 Certainly, the history of
America's immigration laws gives us insight into categories of people who
were undesirable during a particular moment in our nation's history and
justification for closely monitoring the constitutionality of laws that target
immigrant populations.
B. FEDERAL CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR UNLAWFUL PRESENCE
Early immigration laws attempted to impose criminal sanctions on
persons unlawfully present. Criminalizing behavior serves the normative
function of punishing immigrants who violate immigration laws. The
Chinese Exclusion Act70 exemplifies how categorical racial immigration
71
exclusions can be used to render a particular group invisible to the law
when criminal penalties are imposed in connection with civil immigration
violations.
The infamous Chinese Exclusion Act7 2 barred persons of Chinese
descent from immigrating to the United States. In 1892, the Geary Act
sanctioned Chinese nationals who did not have permission to reside in the
United States.73 Chinese nationals unlawfully present were ordered
74
deported, imprisoned and sentenced to hard labor for up to one year.
Section 3 of the Geary Act established deportation proceedings before
a federal judge or commissioner, and Section 4 decreed: That any such
Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and adjudged
to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States, shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year and
69. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic
Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L. J. 1111, 1148 (1998).
70. The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2-9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Aliens and Nationality, ch. 14, §§ 1, 2,
28 Stat. 7 (1893).
71. See generally McKanders, Unspoken Voice, supra, note 65, at 6-7 (explaining terminology
"invisible" in reference to undocumented immigrants as a group is not offered safeguards under
the law as a protected classification or will not come forward to see protection under the law
because fear of retaliation for their undocumented status).
72. The Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2-9, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Aliens and Nationality, ch. 14, §§ 1, 2,
28 Stat. 7 (1893).
73. The Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
74. Gabriel J. Chin, et. al., The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 22
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) ("Any Chinese person accused of being
unlawfully in the United States could be taken before a federal judge or commissioner, and if
found to be unlawfully present shall be imprisoned in a penitentiary for a term of not exceeding
five years, and at the expiration of such term of imprisonment be removed from the United
States." Id. at 32.).
[Vol. 12340
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thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided. 75
In addition, the exclusion act sanctioned unlawful migration with a
sentence of forced labor for Chinese nationals remaining in the country
after the laws were passed. The Geary Act authorized a sentence of hard
labor after a hearing before a federal judge or commissioner. The judges
were subordinate, non-article III judges.n The provision essentially
permitted the judges to bypass the due process rights associated with
78
criminal prosecutions.
In 1896, the constitutionali t of the Geary Act was challenged in
Wong Wing v. United States. The Supreme Court "addresse[d]
congressional power over migration, constitutional protection of aliens
against the federal government, the rights of illegal aliens, the distinction
between civil detention and criminal punishment, and the character of hard
labor as punishment."80  The Supreme Court found the hard labor
provisions unconstitutional, but upheld Congress' power to imprison as part
of its power to control immigration. Specifically, the Court held that
when Congress provides punishment by hard labor for unlawful presence
then it must provide a trial to establish guilt.82 This is the first case to hold
83
that the Bill of Rights protects undocumented immigrants. The Court also
upheld the general principle that as a sovereign the United States has the84
unilateral power to exclude immigrants from its jurisdiction.
75. Id. at 33.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id
78. Id at 33.
79. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 369 ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of the law.... These provisions are universal in their application... without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.' Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection
guarantied [sic] by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a
capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.")).
80. Gerald L. Neumann, Wong Wing v. United States: The Bill of Rights Protects Illegal
Aliens, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 31,41 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck, eds., 2005).
81. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
82. Id. at 237.
83. Id at 238.
84. Id. at 237 ("The United States can, as a matter of public policy, by congressional
enactment, forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel classes of
aliens from their territory, and can, in order to make effectual such decree of exclusion or
expulsion, devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting the persons included in such
decree, and causing their deportation, upon executive or subordinate officials.").
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Wong demonstrates that even prior to the removal/deportation of an
immigrant, Congress attempted to institute a policy that was punitive and
included criminal labor consequences. The Geary Act gave the government
the right to remove criminal due process protections if an immigrant was in
the country in violation of the Act.85 This is an example of how Congress'
unregulated power over immigration, if left unchecked, can attempt to
exploit a vulnerable racial category (Chinese) of persons who were
arbitrarily excluded from the country. Congress sanctioned Chinese
immigrants for their immigration violation and subjected them to criminal
sanctions in their moment of vulnerability. The Wong case established a
distinction between criminal and civil immigration proceedings. The Court
found that Congress can authorize the detention of an unauthorized
immigrant pending civil deportation proceedings, but concluded that
Congress may not append criminal sanctions onto civil deportation without
86providing due process.
Since 1875, Congress has been given deferential authority over
immigration.87 When Congress's statutory enactments are given deference,
there is more justification for strict examination of the motivations and
legality of recent state and local laws, especially recent criminal trespass
laws that attempt to impose criminal sanctions, like the provisions in
Wong.88
85. Neumann, supra note 80, at 32-33.
86. Id.; see also Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
87. Courts are typically deferential to Congressional enactments involving immigration. See
generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (laying out the plenary
powers doctrine which attributed the power as inherent to a sovereign nation); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (."[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over' the admission of aliens") (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). See also Peter Spiro, Symposium: Lady Liberty's Doorstep: Status and
Implications of American Immigration Law, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1997) ("[T]he federal government has enjoyed a virtual carte blanche
on immigration matters."); Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James A.R. Nafzinger, United States
Migration Law: Essentials for Comparison, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 531, 544 (2006) (stating that "[a]
cardinal doctrine of United States constitutional law is that Congress has an inherent, plenary
power in matters of immigration") (footnote omitted), ("Over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is [over the admission of non-citizens]."
(quoting Oceanic Navigation, 214 U.S. at 339)).
88. Angela M. Banks, Comprehensive Immigration Reform Symposium: Problems,
Possibilities and Pragmatic Solutions: Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651,
1651-52, 1681-82 (2009) (stating "[a]t the time that Fong Yue Ting was decided, deportation was
only used to correct admissions mistakes. Deportation grounds were based on inadmissibility
rather than post-entry behavior. Within the last 117 years, the purpose of deportation has
expanded. Now it not only serves to remedy incorrect admissions decisions and deal with those
who evaded the admission process, but it also seeks to regulate the post-entry behavior of
noncitizens. The vast majority of the grounds upon which a noncitizen can be deported are based
on post-entry criminal activity . . . . The growing use of deportation for post-entry behavior,
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II. ARIZONA SB 1070: STATE CRIMINAL TRESPASS LAWS
The highly publicized local and national debate over Arizona's SB
1070 provides insight into current public opinions on immigrants. In April
2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070, which is titled the "Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act." 89 Shortly thereafter, five
states introduced similar bills. The Arizona legislature indicated that
"[t]he provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and
deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by
persons unlawfully present in the United States."91 While many states were
using criminal trespass laws to target immigrants, Arizona was the first to
codify a criminal trespass law that specifically targets undocumented
immigrants. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer claimed that the law was in
reaction to the federal government's unwillingness to pass comprehensive
immigration legislation, effectively forcing the states to enact and enforce
their own immigration laws. 92
There are many sections to Arizona SB 1070. The law essentially
modifies various provisions of Arizona's existing laws. The new provisions
address human trafficking, criminalize hiring day laborers, and provide
sanctions for employers who hire undocumented workers, and penalize
particularly criminal behavior indicates that deportation is no longer a remedial measure; it is now
also a punitive measure. Historically, communities have used deportation, also referred to as
banishment or transportation, to remove 'undesirables' from the communities' borders."); Juliet
Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1683, 1686 (2009) (arguing that
deportation as a sanction eschews proportionality and attempts to create a remedial scheme that
would align immigration law with the broader landscape of legal sanctions; stating that "[w]hile
the enforcement of immigration law has imported substantive criminal law norms, it has left
behind the procedural protections of criminal law. Immigration proceedings do not trigger the
constitutional rights due to defendants in the criminal justice system: the right to a trial by a court
established under Article III of the Constitution, the right to counsel at government expense, the
right not to incriminate oneself, protection against double jeopardy, and the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, among others. Procedurally, immigration law is a civil proceeding
subject only to the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.").
89. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
90. Belluck, supra note 1.
91. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
92. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Arizona Immigration Law, NAT'L PUB. RADIO,
Oct. 28, 2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130833741&ps-cprs
(A recent investigative report on National Public Radio, however, revealed that the American
Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC"), a group of state legislatures along with the Corrections
Corporation of America, paused for the passing of SB 1070. Disclosures from the meetings reveal
"talk [about] how positive [the bill] was going to be for the community . . . the amount of money
that we would realize from each prisoner on a daily rate." The question is whether the Corrections
Corporation of America's involvement gives us insight into the true motivations behind the law.)
see also id., available at http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t-I&islist-
false&id=130833741&m=130878467 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
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smuggling and harboring undocumented immigrants.93 This paper focuses
on the SB 1070 provisions that create state crimes relating to immigration
status and permit state and local officials to enforce immigration provisions.
Specifically, these provisions call for mandatory determination of
immigration status upon arrest, creation of a state criminal trespass law for
failure to carry alien registration documents, and creation of a state crime
for civil violations of federal immigration law.94
Section two of SB 1070, "trespassing by illegal alien, if present on any
public or private land in this state," requires officers to determine an
individual's immigration status. Subsection 2(B) requires officers to make
a reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual's
immigration status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest where
reasonable sus icion exists that the person is unlawfully present in the
United States. Subsection 2(B) also requires that all persons who are96
arrested have their immigration status verified prior to release.
Subsections 2(B) and 2(E) provide the process for verifying immigration97
status and list documents that create a presumption of lawful presence.
Section three of SB 1070 criminalizes the failure to carry an alien
registration document. This section provides that "[a] person is guilty of
willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the
person is in violation of [8 U.S.C. §§] 1304(e) or 1306(a)," which are
federal statutes that require aliens to carry documentation of registration
and penalize the willful failure to register.99
The first offense is a class one misdemeanor, punishable by up to six
months of jail time and an additional $500 fine, as well as jail costs, with
the assessments to be applied toward the Gang and Immigration
Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission ("GIITEM") Fund. 1 00 The second
offense is a class four felony, which is also punishable by up to six months
of jail time, but with an additional $1000 fine and jail costs. 10 Persons
who, in the past five years, have accepted voluntary removal or who have
been deported from the United States would be subject to a class four
93. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
94. Id
95. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
96. Id
97. 1d.§§ 11-1051(B), (E).
98. Id. § 13-1509(A).
99. Id
100. Id. § 13-1509.
101. Id. § 13-1509(H)(2)(a).
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felony charge upon their first arrest under this section.102 A person found in
possession of dangerous drugs or deadly weapons would face a class three
felony charge upon his or her first arrest. 0 3
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE
CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL IMMIGRANT PRESENCE
Since 2007, states and localities have been passing anti-immigrant
laws.104  State and localities should not be able to enforce immigration
laws. 05 The INA is a comprehensive federal law that typically dominates
over state anti-immigrant laws. The immigration supremacy arguments
against state and local immigration regulation are centered on the premise
that states and localities, in enacting laws and ordinances that target
106immigrants, are encroaching on an area that is subject to federal control.
Generally, anti-immigrant laws are beirt challenged in state and federal
courts on federal preemption grounds.' 0  Before analyzing whether state
trespass laws that criminalize unlawful presence of immigrants are
unconstitutionally preempted this section explains the constitutional
preemption doctrine. Part A explains general preemption doctrine and how
the larger preemption doctrine relates to immigration preemption doctrine.
Part B builds on Part A in that it specifically addresses the constitutionality
of Arizona's SB 1070 trespass laws.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution preempts state action
where federal law expressly or impliedly precludes state action.ios The
Supremacy Clause, Article VI § 1, clause 2 of the Constitution, provides:
[t]he Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
109Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
102. Id. § 13-1509(H)(2)(b).
103. Id. § 13-1509(H)(1)(a)-(c).
104. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 6.
105. Id. at 4.
106. McKanders, Arkansas Symposium Piece, supra note 14, at 590-99.
107. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009) cert. granted
by Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-115);
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
108. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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The preemption analysis "starts with an assumption that the historic police
powers of the state[s are] not [to] be superseded by Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' A state or local law can
be expressly or impliedly preempted.
First, under the doctrine of express preemption, a state or local statute
is preempted if it clearly attempts to regulate immigration where Congress
has direct regulatory authority." Second, the doctrine of implied
preemption governs field preemption and conflict preemption.' 2 Under the
implied preemption test, the court's task is essentially one of statutory
construction.
Field preemption exists when Congress intends to occupy the field of
immigration and leaves no room for state or local action. 14
A state statute will be preempted under the field preemption test if
there is a showing that it was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to effect a complete ouster of state power-including state
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws with respect
to the subject matter.1 5
Courts "resort to principles of implied preemption-that is, inquiring
whether Congress has occupied a particular field with the intent to supplant
state law or whether state law actually conflicts with federal law" as a last
resort.' 16
Conflict preemption occurs when a state or local statute "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' Under the conflict preemption doctrine, the
state statute is also impliedly preempted in a situation where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress. Concurrent state and federal
enforcement activities are authorized when they do not impair federal
110. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 45 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
111. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
112. See generally id.
113. Id at 356, 358.
114. See id. at 360.
115. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 21.
116. Id
117. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363.
118. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (stating that field preemption occurs
where the "depth and breadth of a congressional scheme ... occupies the legislative field").
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regulatory interests.l19
The United States Constitution contains no language that expressly
grants Congress the power to regulate immigration. The Constitution
only gives Congress the express power to create a uniform rule of
naturalization.121 Under this power, Congress enacts laws that the
Executive branch (i.e., the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security) enforces. Despite its lack of express congressional
power under the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution, Congress has
exercised complete control over the regulation of immigration. The conflict
between federal immigration law and state laws touching on immigration
stems from a tension between the federal power granted under the
Nationalization Clause and the states' Tenth Amendment police powers to
exercise control over immigrants within their communities.'22
Laws that conflict, or stand as an obstacle to the enforcement of
federal immigration laws and policy, are invalid under the preemption
doctrine. 23 In analyzing the constitutionality of state and local immigration
laws, the plenary powers doctrine requires federal courts to give deference
124
to federal immigration law and policy.
In the immigration field, De Canas v. Bica is the seminal Supreme
Court preemption case.125 In De Canas, the Court held unconstitutional a
California statute that prohibited an employer from knowingly employing
an alien who was not entitled to lawful residence in the United States..
This case arose when migrant farm workers brought an action against farm-
labor contractors alleging that the contractors unlawfully terminated their
119. Id.
120. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 192 (6th ed. 2008).
121. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that "The Congress shall have Power . .. [t]o establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .").
122. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people").
123. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
124. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (laying out the plenary
powers doctrine which attributed the power as inherent to a sovereign nation); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than over the admission of aliens" (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranaham, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Okeke & Nafzinger, supra note 87, at 544 (stating that a cardinal doctrine
of United States constitutional law is that Congress has an inherent, plenary power in matters of
immigration).
125. De Canas, 424 U.S. 351.
126. Id. at 352.
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employment.127 The farm workers argued, and the California courts agreed,
that state regulatory power over immigration was foreclosed because
"Congress 'as an incident of national sovereignty,' enacted the INA as a
comprehensive scheme governing all aspects of immigration and
naturalization, including the employment of aliens.. " 128
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court explained that
it has never held that every state enactment dealing with immigrants is a
regulation of immigration and is per se preempted. The Court reasoned,
"standing alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
render it a regulation of immigration . . . . The Court found that
Congress did not express an intention to fully occupy the field of employing
undocumented immigrants.13' In addition, the Court held that the California
statute did not regulate immigration; instead, it narrowly regulated
employing undocumented immigrants under the state's police powers.132
Scholars have acknowledged, "because De Canas establishes a
preemption analysis favorable to state and local regulations-including
invoking a presumption against federal preemption and holding that the
INA does not completely occupy the immigration field-it is clear that few
state and local [immigration] laws will actually be preempted by the
INA."l 33 De Canas has been interpreted for establishing that "the power to
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.", 34 As
a result in De Canas, the Supreme Court narrowly defined immigration as
". . . essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
'35remain."'3
Two other recent immigration federal preemption cases are Chamber
of Commerce of the US. v. Whiting (formerly entitled Chicanos Por La
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano),136 and Lozano v. City of Hazleton. In
127. Id at 353.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 355.
130. Id
131. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357.
132. Id at 351.
133. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 23 (quoting Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical
Power ofState and Local Governments to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV.
899, 918-19 (1997)).
134. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354..
135. Id. at 355.
136. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion
amended and superseded on denial of rehearing by Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
558 F.3d 856 (2008), sub nom. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498
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Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act.138 On
December 8, 2010 this case was argued before the United States Supreme
Court.139 The Legal Arizona Workers Act permits Arizona to revoke the
business license of employers who hire undocumented immigrants.14 0 The
'4'Act also requires employers to use the e-verify system. The e-verify is a
database that the United States government maintains which permits
businesses to verify whether their employees are authorized to work in the
United Statesl42 It is an alternative to the paper based 1-9 verification
system whereby employers must obtain documentation from prospective
employees to verify their citizenship status prior to hiring.143 Similarly, in
Lozano, the city of Hazleton's ordinances addressed the presence and
employment of undocumented immigrants and a housing ordinance that
prohibited landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants.14 4 Like the
Arizona statute in Napolitano, Hazleton's emplo ment ordinance
sanctioned businesses for hiring undocumented workers.
In Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit found that the INA did not expressly
preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act.146 The court first held that the Act
falls within the Immigration Reform and Control Act's savings clause. 4 1
The savings clause provides that "[t]he provisions of this section preempt
any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or
refer for a fee for employment of unauthorized aliens." Relying on the
language of this provision, the Ninth Circuit found that the law does not
(2010).
137. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Penn. 2007) on appeal to 620 F.3d
170 (3d Cir. 2010).
138. Napolitano, 544 F.3d at 981.
139. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, No. 09-115, 2010 WL 4974382 (U.S. 2010)
(oral argument).
140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211-216 (2008).
141. Id. §§23-211,213.
142. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 402 (IIRIRA), 8
U.S.C. § 1324a (a)(1)(A) (1996) (pursuant to IIRIRA pilot programs were established for
employers to verify the employment eligibility of their employees. IIRIRA states "[njo person or
entity participating in a pilot program shall be civilly or criminally liable under any law for any
action taken in good faith reliance on information provided through the confirmation system."
Under IIRIRA, the e-verify system was created).
143. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitanao, 544 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2008).
144. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176-80 (3d Cir. 2010).
145. Id
146. Napolitano, 544 F.3d at 982-85.
147. Id. at 982.
148. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
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attempt to define who is eligible and ineligible to work in the country.149
The court found that the savings clause provided states and localities with
the option of suspending the business license of an employer who hires
undocumented immigrants.'so
Contrastingly, the Third Circuit court in Lozano, analyzing the same
savings clause in IRCA, held that Hazleton's ordinances were
unconstitutional and expressly and impliedly preempted.'"' The court
found:
By imposing additional sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized
aliens, while not penalizing those who discriminate, Hazleton has
elected to place all of its weight on one side of the regulatory scale.
This creates the exact situation that Congress feared: a system under
which employers might quite rationally choose to err on the side of
discriminating against job applicants they perceive to be foreign. This
is inconsistent with IRCA and therefore cannot be tolerated under the
Supremacy Clause.152
Moreover, the court found that Hazleton failed to take into account the
complexities of federal immigration law; where there are many categories
under which an immigrant may fall that would make the immigrant
unlawfully within the country.' 53 The court noted that: "Hazleton attempts
to regulate residence based solely on immigration status. Deciding which
aliens may live in the United States has always been the prerogative of the
federal government. Hazleton purposefully chose to enter this area of
significant federal presence." 54 The Third Circuit found Hazelton's
ordinance unconstitutionally attempted to regulate immigration-a federal
155power.
The Third Circuit's opinion conflicts with the Ninth Circuit. Both
cases are interpreting the same savings clause in IRCA but interpret the
savings clause differently. The conflict will finally be resolved when the
Supreme Court issues its decision on the Ninth Circuit Napolitano case.156
149. Napolitano, 544 F.3d at 985.
150. Id at 984-85.
151. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 218-19.
152. Id at 218.
153. Id. at 220.
154. Id
155. Id. at 218-19.
156. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (when the case went
up on appeal to the Supreme Court Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano became
Candelaria).
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Where the Napolitano and Hazelton cases focus on local and state
employment and housing provisions and a specific savings clause in IRCA,
another Circuit Court case, Gonzalez v. Peoria, addresses whether the INA
preempts states and local police officers from enforcing the civil and
criminal provisions of the INA.' In Peoria, the Ninth Circuit held that
local governments can enforce the more complex criminal provisions of
immigration laws, but they cannot enforce the civil provisions. The court
reasoned that criminal immigration provisions are few, narrow, and
unsupported by a complex administrative structure. 59  This case differs
from Napolitano and Hazleton in that states and localities enacted their own
immigration statutes and were attempting to create state and local
immigration enforcement regimes. Whereas, in Peoria, the state officers
were enforcing the INA's criminal provisions without enacting a state or
local statute. Therefore, there is a reasonable inference that the federal
government did not occupy the field of immigration enforcement with
respect to the criminal provisions.
In reaching this conclusion, the court found it imperative to
distinguish between criminal and civil immigration violations. The court
explained that criminal violations apply to aliens who have illegally entered
the country.160 In contrast, civil violations also apply to aliens who are
illegally present in the United States.161 The court found that there are
numerous reasons why a person might be illegally present in the United
States without having entered in violation of § 1325 which is a criminal
provision.162 For example, the "expiration of a visitor's visa, change of
student status, or acquisition of prohibited employment" could all cause an
alien to be illegally present in the country without having violated any
criminal provision. The court found that the arrest of a person for illegal
164
presence would exceed the authority granted to local police by state law.
The court held that "nothing in federal law precluded the [local police] from
enforcing the criminal provisions of the [NA]," specifically § 1325, "where
there is probable cause to believe the arrestee has illegally entered the
United States."165 The court found that the "enforcement procedures must
distinguish illegal entry from illegal presence and must comply with all
157. Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 475.
160. Id. at 476.
161. Id.
162. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 477.
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arrest requirements imposed by the federal Constitution."' 66 Peoria does
not read the De Canas case as narrowly holding that local governments,
namely local police officers, are barred from enforcing the criminal
provisions of immigration laws. 67
Federal immigration laws do delegate some authority to state and local
officers. The delegated authority includes the ability to enter into
Memorandums of Understanding with state and local law enforcement to
detain undocumented immigrants. 68  Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 grants the
right to make an arrest for a violation of the harboring provisions to officers
whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws.169 State and local law
enforcement officials also enter into cooperation agreements to share data
on undocumented immigrants. 170  Most people are aware of 287(g)
agreements which provide for state and local law enforcement non-
171
emergency assistance in the enforcement of immigration laws. "None of
these provisions or any other such narrow cooperative arrangement
implicates core immigration functions, and neither exemplifies inherent
authority. Thus, this limited cooperation assistance is carefully set out by
Congress as a modest delegation, and even so, one that very few
jurisdictions have undertaken."' 72
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SB 1070 CRIMINALIZING
UNLAWFUL IMMIGRATION STATUS
Numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging the constitutionality of
SB 1070. 173 In United States v. Arizona, the plaintiffs argued that "the
power to regulate immigration is vested exclusively in the federal
government and that the provisions of SB 1070 are therefore preempted by
Federal law." 74 The U.S. Department of Justice further argued that "the
overall statutory scheme of SB 1070 is preempted because it attempts to set
immigration policy at the state level and interferes and conflicts with
166. Id
167. Id at 474-75.
168. Olivas, supra note 8, at 52.
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (2001).
171. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
172. Olivas, supra note 8, at 53 (stating that "Congress does not want, and the separation of
powers and preemption theory do not allow, a substantial subcontracting of this basic immigration
authority to state and local governments").
173. Ann Morse, Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Laws, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20263 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011).
174. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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federal immigration law, foreign relations and foreign policy." 7 5 On July
6, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ordered
that the enforcement of SB 1070 be stayed pending the litigation of the
statute's constitutionality.'
This section addresses the constitutional preemption arguments
against SB 1070's provisions that criminalize unlawful presence. The
constitutionality of the criminal provisions of SB 1070 is contingent upon:
(1) whether a state law can validly permit the Arizona police to detect and
arrest for civil immigration violations; and (2) whether states can create
separate state criminal trespass laws for violating federal civil immigration
provisions. These two functions that Congress statutorily assigned to the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security in the INA and are thus
constitutionally preempted.
First, state and local government officials are constitutionally
preempted from making a mandatory determination of immigration status
upon arrest as this is a function typically exercised by the Federal
Government under the INA. As the Lazano court correctly stated, there are
many categories under which an immigrant may fall that would make the
immigrant unlawfully within the country.' 7 7 The second provision of SB
1070 permits state government officials to determine the immigration status
of a person upon arrest is constitutionally preempted because it conflicts
with the Immigration and Nationality Act as permitting state officials to
make determinations regarding immigration status implicates a core
immigration function reserved for the federal government. De Canas
expressly holds that the power to regulate immi ration, the entrance and
exit of immigrants, is exclusively a federal power.
Section two of SB 1070, subsection 2(B) requires officers to make a
reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual's
immigration status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully present in the
United States. Subsection 2(B) also requires that all persons who are
arrested have their immigration status verified prior to release.
Subsections 2(B) and 2(E) provide the process for verifying immigration
status and list documents that create a presumption of lawful presence.
175. Id. at 992.
176. Id. at 1008.
177. Lazano, 620 F.3d at 218-19.
178. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
179. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
180. Id.
181. Id. §§ I -1051(B), (E).
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The issue is whether a local police officer can determine a person's
immigration status when this is a function normally reserved for
immigration judges and immigration officials. Depending on the situation,
it would be extremely difficult from looking at a person to tell whether they
182
are lawfully in the country as unlawful presence is a legal construct.
U.S. citizenship is not a characteristic apparent to the eye or dependent
upon a person's appearance insofar as it is a legal determination. U.S.
citizens are not required to carry proof of their citizenship while inside
of the United States. Therefore, it is unlikely that in a routine
encounter with law enforcement a U.S. citizen will possess a birth
certificate, U.S. passport, naturalization certificate, or certificate
of citizenship demonstrating citizenship. ... Birth in the United
States certainly is a clear indicator that a person is not an alien.
84
But, foreign-birth is not a certain indicator of alienage. Acquisition of
citizenship at birth depends on numerous factors, such as the parents'
respective citizenships; the duration and timing of their residence in
the United States; their marital status at the time of the individual's
birth; the year in which the person was born; the place where the
person was born, and in some situations, even the date on which a
child born out of wedlock was legitimated-none of which can be
ascertained or observed by police in any contact or that could give rise,
185
constitutionally, to any suspicion of alienage.
When states enforce immigration, anyone who looks or sounds "foreign"
will be targeted. State and local officials lack training to identify
undocumented immigrants, which leads to racial profiling and
discrimination. Undoubtedly, enforcement of the Arizona law will lead
187
to arbitrary requests of persons to produce identity documents.
On its face, having a police officer make a reasonable attempt, when
practicable, to determine an individual's immigration status during any
182. Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 5, United States v. Arizona, No. CVIO-1413-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. July 6, 2010),
available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=32246.
183. Id. at 3.
184. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1).
185. Id (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1994); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (1994) (establishing conditions under
which children born in wedlock outside of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth); § 1409
(1994) (establishing conditions under which children born out-of-wedlock outside of the United States
acquire U.S. Citizenship at birth)).
186. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 30-31.
187. ACLU of Arizona Section by Section Analysis of SB 1070 "Immigration; Law
Enforcement; Safe Neighborhoods, " ACLU OF ARIZONA 1, http://www.courthousenews.com/
2010/04/16/ACLUAZImmig.pdf [hereinafter ACLUAnalysis].
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lawful stop, detention, or arrest where reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is unlawfully present in the United States is an immigration function
that is typically left to trained administrative law judges within the
Department of Justice, not state government officials. Accordingly, this
provision creates a conflict with existing federal law and is constitutionally
preempted.
On this issue, the U.S. Department of Justice argued "that this section
is preempted because it will result in the harassment of lawfully present
aliens," will burden federal resources and will impede federal immigration
enforcement priorities. In the Arizona district court order granting the
stay, the court found, with respect to unifying naturalization and
immigration laws, "Congress manifested a purpose to regulate immigration
in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens
through one uniform national . .. system [] and to leave them free from the
possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance."' 89 The court
predicted that this section of SB 1070 will be invalidated based on the
restriction of the liberty interests of documented immigrants and the burden
the law places on federal resources.1 90 The court also agreed with the
United States that this section of SB 1070 would place immigrants in
"continual jeopardy of having to demonstrate their lawful status to non-
federal officials." The court reasoned that "the federal government has
long rejected a system by which aliens' papers are routinely demanded and
checked" as this would constitute an unlawful restriction of liberty.,92
Second, Arizona is constitutionally preempted from enacting a
criminal trespass statute that makes it a state crime for an immigrant to fail
to comply with federal alien registration laws. Section three of SB 1070
impliedly conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1304 which governs failure to register.
Section three, "trespassing by illegal aliens," creates a state crime for
presence on any public or private land in the state for "willful failure to
complete or carry an alien registration document in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1304(e) or 1306(a)." 93  Section 1304(e) provides that an alien may be
subject to criminal liability for willful failure to comply with the
registration laws. 94 An immigrant who has never registered or applied for
a certificate of alien registration cannot be charged with violating the
188. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (D. Ariz. 2010).
189. Id. at 994 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941)).
190. Id. at 997-98.
191. Id. at 996-98.
192. Id. at 997.
193. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1509(A) (2010).
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (1996).
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statute, which requires that the immigrant have in his or her possession any
registration documents issued to him or her.195
This section of the statute is impliedly preempted because it is not
possible to comply with both the federal and state statute. Conflict
preemption occurs when a state or local statute "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."19 6 Under the conflict preemption doctrine, the state statute is
also impliedly preempted in a situation where compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomlishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' 9
Under the federal scheme, the Attorney General can prepare forms
which require an immigrant to notify the government when they entered the
United States, their place of entry, their purpose for entering the country,
how long they will be in the country, and their criminal record.' 98 After
registration, the immigrant is provided with a certificate.' 99 The INA
provides a penalty for failing to carry the certificate which include: a
misdemeanor, a fine not to exceed $100 and/or imprisonment for no more
than thirty days.200 Arizona's statute is an impermissible state regulation of
immigration as it creates a dual state crime of trespassing on state land
without carrying the certificate. An immigrant in violation of SB 1070 will
also be in violation of § 1304. Thus, it directly conflicts with federal law as
it creates new penalties for violating the federal law. Specifically, the
Arizona District Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to be successful
on the merits of challenging the constitutionality of this provision because
SB 1070 "alters the penalties established by Congress under the federal
alien registration scheme.",20  Again, the court also relied on the resources
that it will take to enforce this provision and the restraint on liberty to U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents to support the unconstitutionality of
202
this provision.
Third, Arizona is constitutionally preempted from enacting a statute
that provides state governmental officials to make a determination as to
195. See United States v. Mendez-Lopez, 528 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Okla. 1981).
196. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976).
197. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (stating that field preemption occurs
where the "depth and breadth of a congressional scheme . . . occupies the legislative field").
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1996).
199. Id. § 1304(d).
200. Id. § 1304(e).
201. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (D. Ariz. 2010).
202. Id. at 994, 997-98.
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whether an immigrant has committed a removable offense as this is a direct
exercise of federal immigration power. Field preemption exists when
Congress intends to occupy the field of immigration and leaves no room for
state or local action.203 De Canas clearly provides that the power to
regulate immigration, the entrance and exit of immigrants is exclusively a
federal power. 04 Accordingly, Congress has clearly occupied the field of
making a determination of which immigrants are removable from the
United States.
SB 1070 provides that an officer may make a warrantless arrest if he
or she has probable cause to believe that an individual has "committed any
public offense that makes the person removable from the United States."2 05
This provision gives state officers the authority to arrest immigrants on the
basis of civil deportability. Under this provision, officers would engage in a
two-step inquiry; first, determining what Arizona law has been violated;
and second, determining whether the crime is a deportable offense.206 This
is clearly an attempt to permit state officers to make immigration
determinations.
This section provides that immigration status may be determined by a
law enforcement officer authorized by the federal government or pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).207 This federal statute provides that the federal
government has a duty to respond to inquiries by state or local government
agencies attempting to verify the immigration status of a person within their
jurisdiction for any purpose authorized by law.208 Pursuant to section three
of SB 1070, law enforcement officers are not permitted to consider race,
color, or national origin in implementing the provisions of this act.209 This
section was added after complaints that SB 1070 would cause
discrimination against persons perceived to look or sound foreign-namely
Latino immigrants. Section six of SB 1070 states "[a] peace officer, without
a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe
the person to be arrested has committed any public offense that makes the
person removable from the United States."2 10
These three provisions criminalize under state law the unlawful
203. See Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980.
204. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
205. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 6 (Ariz. 2010) (amending § 13-3883(A)(5) of
Arizona Revised Statutes).
206. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
207. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-1509(B)(1)(2) (2010).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1996).
209. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 23-212(B) (2008).
210. Id. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2010).
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presence of undocumented immigrants. This law overlaps with the INA.
The main preemption issue with this provision of SB 1070 is that it requires
all state and local law enforcement officers to investigate a person's
immigration status when certain indicators exist that give rise to reasonable
suspicion that a person is unlawfully in the country, even if that person is
not suspected of a state crime or unrelated immigration offense. This is a
211federal power. Under this law, a person is effectively presumed to be in
the United States unlawfully unless he or she can present valid government
212identification. Unlike the early exclusionary immigration laws that were
hard to enforce, laws like Arizona's seek to use state and local officials,
namely police officers, to detect unlawful presence and enforce federal
immigration laws. SB 1070 seeks to have anyone who is suspected of
being an immigrant produce documentation showing that he or she is
lawfully in the United States and subjects immigrants who fail to comply
with the law to criminal penalties.
The 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) establishes the procedure and vests the
administrative body with the "sole and exclusive procedure for determining
the deportability of an alien." 2 13
The procedure requires, among other things, that only a 'special
inquiry officer' (an immigration judge) may conduct deportation
proceedings. Only specified federal officials can commence
deportation proceedings, and only an immigration judge in deportation
proceedings can determine that an alien is deportable and order the
alien to leave the United States.214
The district court in United States v. Arizona relied on Justice Alito's
concurrence in Padilla v. Kentucky in granting the stay on SB 1070 and
articulated that determining whether a crime is a deportable offense is a
very complex task in which federal judges and immigration judges are
specifically tasked with performing. Under this rationale, state officers
cannot adequately determine whether an individual is lawfully present in
the United States, and certainly cannot do so by observing a person's
conduct because immigration status is a legal construct that is not readily
apparent when viewing a person. For example, the list of categories for
lawful presence in the United States may include: refugees, withholding of
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008).
212. ACLUAnalysis, supra note 187, at 1.
213. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
see also Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (1996).
214. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 777; see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1252a (1996).
215. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000-07 (D. Ariz. 2010). See generally
Vazquez, supra note 8 (discussing the immigration consequences of criminal convictions).
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deportation, humanitarian parole, spouses and children of aliens, legalized
temporary protected status, Salvadorans granted Deferred Enforcement
Departure status, emergent or humanitarian reasons, and women who
qualify under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.216 These
categories of persons exemplify the difficulties in allowing state officers to
determine immigration status.
Arizona argues that this provision only targets those who are
removable from the United States and will only affect those immigrants
217
unlawfully present. However, Arizona is impermissibly exercising
federal immigration functions because in order to detain a person the police
officer must make a preliminary determination as to the person's
immigration status. 21 8  Arizona also argues that the federal government
encourages state and local involvement in enforcement of immigration
219programs. For example, 287(g) programs encourage state participation in
regulating unlawful immigration. As articulated above, the
Naturalization Clause of the United States Constitution provides Congress
with the responsibility for setting immigration policy. Congress can
216. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 778. This case
construes various immigration statutes as follows: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42) (2010), 1157 (2005)
("[r]efugees are persons determined by the INS to have been persecuted or to have a well founded
fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
[sic] political opinion" id at n.15); 8 U.S.C. §§ I105a(a)(3) (2006), 1254 (1996) ("[a]n alien
found deportable and ordered deported by an immigration judge may be eligible for suspension or
stay of deportation for emergent or humanitarian reasons" id. at n.22); 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1996)
("[t]he Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994) provides that battered immigrant women and children may become
legalized by self-petition for immediate relative or second preference status under the INA or by
application for suspension of deportation on the basis of abuse" id. at n.23); 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)
(1996) ("[p]ersons paroled by the INS into the United States based on humanitarian or public
interest considerations may be authorized for indefinite stays" id. at n.18); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1996) ("[a] person is eligible for withholding of deportation if his or her 'life or freedom would
be threatened in [the home] country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion"' id. at n.17); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (1996) ("[a]liens living
in the United States may be granted temporary protected status where unsafe conditions in their
countries of origin make it a hardship to return" id. at n.20); 8 C.F.R. § 242.6 ("[t]he spouses and
children of aliens legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act's ("IRCA") amnesty
provisions are protected from deportation by family unity status" id. n.19); Deferral of Enforced
Departure for Salvadorans, 57 Fed. Reg. 28, 700-28, 701 (June 26, 1992) ("Salvadorans granted
DED status that officially expired at the end of 1994 remain in the United States with the
permission of the INS on the basis of family relationships, continuing eligibility for work
authorization and other grounds." id at n.2 1).
217. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 993-94.
218. Id at 994-95.
219. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) (1996), 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) (2006).
220. Olivas, supra note 8, at 51 (MOUs entered into between states and federal government to
apprehend undocumented immigrants).
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determine how it, as an institution, wants to integrate state and local
resources. This should not be reversed by permitting states and localities to
set immigration policy and determine how they would like to contribute to
establishing federal immigration policy.
There is an issue of implied preemption when examining SB 1070's
provision that imposing state penalties for unlawful presence conflict with
221
the INA's criminal provisions sanctioning unlawful entry and re-entry
and civil immigration penalties for unlawful presence as a ground for
222deportation. The INA specifically provides a civil remedy for unlawful
presence in the United States (i.e. detention and deportation after a hearing).
In the same way that the court in Peoria found that the arrest of a person for
civil immigration violations would exceed the authority granted to the local
223police by state law, similarly states cannot enact statutes that create
criminal sanctions for civil immigration violations where there is no
violation in the INA. In Peoria, the Ninth Circuit held that "nothing in
federal law precluded [the local police] from enforcing the criminal
provisions of the [INA]," specifically § 1325, "where there is probable
cause to believe that the arrestee has illegally entered the United States." 224
The court found that the "enforcement procedures must distinguish illegal
entry from illegal presence and must comply with all arrest requirements
imposed by the federal Constitution."2 25 In this case, SB 1070 makes it a
criminal offense to be unlawfully present in the in the United States, which
directly conflicts with the INA.
Further, under the INA, unlawful presence is a civil violation, not a
226
criminal violation. SB 1070 makes it a criminal violation to be in the
United States unlawfully. This creates a conflict with existing federal law.
The constitutionality of state and local laws must be viewed in light of the
concept that violations of immigration law are civil, not criminal,
violations. The Supreme Court, in finding that the Geary Act was
unconstitutional, stated:
221. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2010) (unlawful entry
has been a crime since 1929, see Act of Mar. 4, 1929, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 276 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2010) (illegal re-entry provisions).
222. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)-(C) (1996); 8 U.S.C. l182(a)(1)(B)-(C)
(2010) (unlawful presence is a ground for deportation and is not subject to criminal penalty,
except when an alien is present in the United States after having been removed).
223. Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983).
224. Id
225. Id
226. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)-(C) (1996); 8 U.S.C. 182(a)(1)(B)-(C)
(2010) (unlawful presence is a ground for deportation and is not subject to criminal penalty,
except when an alien is present in the United States after having been removed).
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The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a
banishment in the sense in which that word is often applied to the
expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but
a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who
has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which
the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority
and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing
to reside here shall depend.227
There is no section in the INA that makes unlawful presence a crime.
Catherine Dauvergene appropriately states:
The illegality of people erases entitlements to human rights by
rendering people invisible to the law . . .. [t]his is the contemporary
equivalent of civil death . . .. A few decades ago, crossing borders in
contravention of the law was regarded as a transgression that was not
truly criminalized. It has now become a transgression more condemned
than criminal acts removing all rights.228
Further, a conflict between SB 1070 and the INA arises where the
methods in which state and local police officers use to establish an
individual's immigration status differs from federal immigration judges and
officials. On April 29, 2010, Arizona amended its statute to
specify that law enforcement officials cannot consider race, color or
national origin when implementing the provisions of [SB 1070] except
as permitted by the U.S. or Arizona Constitution. The law clarified the
original law's language around 'reasonable suspicion' by requiring
state and local law enforcement to reasonably attempt to determine the
immigration status of a person only while in the process of a lawful
stop, detention or arrest (the original language referred to 'lawful
contact'). [The law] also stipulated that a lawful stop, detention or
arrest must be in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a
229
county, city or town of this state.
Despite of the different arguments regarding which level of
government should regulate immigration; there is no question that when a
state or locality passes a law in which the federal government has expressly
stated that the states and localities cannot act, the states and local laws are
constitutionally preempted. Less clear are areas where the federal
government is silent or where states and localities are legislating pursuant to
227. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)).
228. DAUVERGENE, supra note 22, at 174.
229. Morse, supra note 173.
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230
their Tenth Amendment police powers. The legislatures passing state and
local laws targeting immigrants state that they are legislating pursuant to
their Tenth Amendment police powers, but the laws affect whether
documented and undocumented immigrants will remain in their state and
sometimes within the country. When this occurs, the doctrine of implied
preemption should apply to bar state and local laws targeting immigrants
under the guise of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the state and
localities.
The traditional implied preemption justification for why states and
localities should not be permitted to target immigrants is that the United
States, as a national sovereign, has the authority to decide which persons
should enter and exit the United States. The foreign policy justification is
another reason why states and localities have traditionally been excluded
from regulating immigrants. The rationale is that the federal government
does not want states and localities to unnecessarily embroil the country in
arguments with other countries by their treatment of foreign nationals.23
The INA supplies another justification for preemption. The INA is a
comprehensive act that provides a system for managing who is lawfully
within the country, adjusting the status of immigrants, and providing
guidance for immigration officers and judges making determinations as to
who fits the criteria under the INA. The expansiveness of the INA leaves
no room for state and local regulation of immigration.232
CONCLUSION
State trespass laws that criminalize unlawful presence of immigrants
are unconstitutional regulations of immigration and are a preempted
exercise of state power. State and local governments cannot cite the failure
of the federal government to pass comprehensive immigration reform as the
rationale for adopting unconstitutional state immigration laws.233 As U.S.
immigration history demonstrates, immigration laws can arbitrarily exclude
234
certain races, religions and "undesirable" populations. Throughout the
history of immigration regulation, laws have been used to differentiate
between those who are deemed worthy of inclusion and "others." The
standards utilized may be based on societal bias and capitalize on the
unworthy population of the time. Similarly, states, like Arizona, cannot use
230. U.S. CONST. amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
231. McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13, at 37-39.
232. See generally id.
233. Sullivan, supra note 92.
234. See discussion supra Part 1.
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state and local laws to cause the attrition of immigrants from the
community as the control of the entrance and exit of immigrants into the
United States is a clearly federal power. If states and localities are
permitted to enact laws enforcing federal immigration laws, our country
will have fifty different iterations of pro- and anti- immigrant laws.2 3 5 This
will cause the unequal regulation and enforcement of immigration laws
236
which will lead to violations of immigrants' rights.
235. See generally McKanders, Hazleton, supra note 13.
236. Id.
363201l]

